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Aiming to provide an overall assessment of the impact of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of
Brazil (“CFRB” - which is in effect since 1988), in the construction of a Democratic State of Law, over the
past 30 years, this article investigates how the institutional improvements achieved took form, the
transformation of the State's role in the enforcement of human rights and individual guarantees, and the
changes that took place towards a democratic political culture, both from the perspective of the citizen
relating to the State and the citizen relating to the State's external oversight body (“TCU” - Federal Audit
Court). In this sense, this article highlights the circumstances in which the governance of the Federal
Executive Branch has been formed in the past thirty years, in what pertains to its oversight, i.e., by analyzing
some of the institutional arrangements obtained and the practices adopted in search of greater transparency
and wider accountability for the public affairs. In this period, it is possible to assert that there has been
progress in the oversight of the activities of the federal government, with a more institutionalized, direct and
easier access by all Brazilians to the information of public entities, on the other hand there are not any
consolidated or conclusive information regarding the quality of the information received by the citizens.

I.

Governance and the Social Control of Public Affairs

In the past 30 years, it is possible to point out the major institutional landmarks that impacted the Public
Governance of the Brazilian State and, in so doing, have as a starting point the reasons expressed by the
Constitution pertaining to the organization and administration of the branches of power of the state. The
governance of the bodies and entities of the public administration involves basic functions of the State, in
the steering, oversight and evaluation of the management of the public machine and its public policies
(Referencial básico de governança, TCU, 2014, p.30-32). Today, both in theory and in practice, the most upto-date concept of public governance proposes a new approach to government, understood as a
comprehensive, plural and complex process of society, which involves the integration of politics and
administration, of management and public policies (Martins and Marini, 2014, p.43) and presents a normative
vision of the accountability of public administrators as a basic asset of democracy - the democratic
accountability (Diamond, 1999, p.30).
Good public governance requires transparency in the acts of government, i.e., the systematic production and
disclosure of information (Mota Filho, 2017, p.20) and aims to generate social benefits. So much so that for
the administration councilmembers of the federal government corporations, the greatest improvement of the
Government Corporations Law 1 consisted in its command for greater transparency in the disclosure of
relevant information (FDC, 2018 and Sardenberg, 2018, p. 14). Within the legal landmarks, counting from
the Federal Constitution, this article aims to highlight how the governance of the Federal Executive Branch
took form in the past thirty years, by way of overseeing it, that is, by analyzing some of the institutional
arrangements obtained and the practices adopted in the search of greater transparency and wider
accountability for the public affairs. This perspective has been chosen to directly provide information
pertaining to the degree of access to information from the Federal Government that citizens enjoy and about
what is the possible degree of knowledge that Brazilians have in what regards to the effective results of public
actions and policies. In this sense, examining the roles played by the oversight bodies of public accounts
(external control) when overseeing the advances of the public administration and directly by the citizens
when they demand information from administrators, questioning the government and taking part in decisions
of public policies (social control) is made all the more important. With this, this article intends to outline how
the administration of the Brazilian Democratic State improved institutionally, in light of the transparency of
the external and social controls, which are fundamental for the implementation of fundamental rights.
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Within the limits of this article, the choice for a more specific analysis of the realm of transparency in the
federal public administration is justified taking into account that the publicity of government acts is one of
the foundations of the Democratic State of Law upheld by the CFRB. According to its own constituent
legislators: access to information of public bodies is essential for the improvement of the government
machine, for the correction of eventual abuses, for the fight against corruption and for the full exercise of
one’s civic duties. Because of those reasons, the right to information is entered in the list of fundamental
rights and guarantees of our Constitution (CFRB, art.5º, XIV and XXXIII). This approach also allows for
the confirmation of some perceptions regarding the increase of the Brazilian civil society's engagement in
public affairs, expressed in the surveys of Transparency International (Transparency International, 2017,
Research Analysis), and if they corresponded to an effective search for more information about the actions
of the government.
The analysis of the level of transparency and form of accountability of the Federal Government provides an
assessment of the improvement of the public governance of information, in the period of the New Republic
(1988-2018), and it contributes to strengthen the knowledge about the implementation of the values
established by the CFRB and answer if and how Brazilian institutions have been able to honor part of the
promises therein enshrined, especially in what pertains to the universalization of access to the public of
information regarding government actions and the accountability of said actions.

II.

Institutional Landmarks

In the logic of the constituent legislators, the effectiveness of fundamental rights and guarantees is directly
related with the capacity for oversight of state actions and public policies. In this logic, it was necessary to
gift citizens and the very institutional apparatus of the State with the means to oversee state actions and
public policies.
The CFRB, also known as Citizen's Constitution, established that access to information is a fundamental
right of the individuals and stressed publicity as a principle of the Public Administration. Because of the
Constitution, several measures have been adopted to promote the dissemination of information to the
society, especially in the context of the Federal Government, and mainly regarding the use of public
resources. When analyzing the main institutional landmarks of this constitutional trend, a larger advancement
on the public transparency issue can be observed, as of the 2000s, with the promulgation of various laws and
regulations and the adoption of many institutional measures aiming for its consolidation.
Thus, in the federal context, between 2000 and 2012, the Fiscal Responsibility Law (2001) was promulgated
in order to ensure greater access and oversight of public accounts; the Office of the Federal Controller
General was created as an internal oversight body of the executive branch (2003); the Transparency Portal
(2004) was implemented to increase the transparency of public management, allowing citizens to monitor
how the public funds are spent and to help oversee the expenditure; the public electronic bidding for the
purchase of common goods and services was regulated, in the Federal context, with a nation-wide disclosure;
SICONV - System for the Management of Contracts (2007) was created, an online tool that consolidates and
processes information on the transfers of Federal Resources, in order to give more transparency about where
public money is spent; a policy of transparency of government was consolidated, with specific rules and
procedures to facilitate the exercise of the constitutional right of access to public information by the society
(2012); and the Integrated System of Registration of CEIS/CNEP (2013) was developed in order to publicize,
on the Transparency Portal, all data from the National Registry of Suspended and Untrustworthy Companies
(CEIS) and the National Registry of Punished Companies (CNEP).
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When it comes to public oversight, at the federal level, the role played by the TCU, with constitutional
attributions of a federal government external oversight body, in assisting the Congress in the mission of
monitoring the country's budget and financial undertakings stand out. Throughout all this time, a
constitutional and institutional understanding about the competences comprehended by the TCU was
consolidated.
Considering the comprehensiveness of the constitutional role assigned to the TCU and, also, the increase of
its oversight attributions over the years, it is possible to observe that this oversight body has become strategic
for the monitoring of the public actions and policies in general. This shows that the constitutional order has
opted to strengthen the external oversight of the executive branch and that the subsequent federal legislators
confirmed and reinforced this constitutional option, strengthening the bodies by increasing their institutional
attributions.
Institutional landmarks subsequent to the Citizen's Constitution served not only to confirm the constitutional
logic of the citizens themselves (social control) and the external oversight bodies (TCU) monitoring public
actions, but it has also deepened it. Thus, one can assert that both in the light of the social control aspect and
in that of the external oversight, substantial institutional improvements have been made. Apparently, the
institutional improvements of the transparency social control were more concentrated in time and took place
with more intensity in the last decade, while the trend of institutional improvements of external control was
less concentrated in time.
However, it should be asked whether the institutional instruments available were used effectively and if they
lived up to the expectations regarding the improvement of the Brazilian citizens' fundamental right of having
access to information regarding public affairs. For that, it is valid to heed the implementations of these
institutional instruments both in the light of the citizen in relation to the State and the citizen in relation to
the external oversight body.

III.

Transparency and the Social Control of the Public Administration

Good public governance always demands the transparency of government acts, which is nothing more than
the systematic production and disclosure of information to the public (Mota Filho, 2017, p.20). But in this
matter it is important to realize that the logic of the external oversight of the public affairs does not necessarily
follow the same logic of the social control. While the bodies that are responsible for the external control have
the power and legal duty to monitor and control state activities, using their functional structures and
bureaucracies, in the social control the citizen has the right, guaranteed by the Constitution, to monitor the
public administration. For the social control of public actions regarding social services, for example, the
population participates in the creation of social assistance policies and in the control of these actions 2. Thusly,
social control is only possible when the information made transparent is capable of becoming an instrument
that allows the citizen or society in general to act. The logic of the social control involves a qualified participation
of citizens or of social organizations. For some, this participation can be seen as a co-management
relationship, when the planning and implementation of public actions are defined with the participation of
the society (Arnstein, 1969, p.216-217). In this line, in 2018, the city councilors of the Federal District
approved a law that establishes guidelines for a comprehensive social participation in the definition,
implementation and oversight of resources intended for municipal public policies 3. For others, the social
control corresponds to the oversight performed by society, whether it is by its citizens or institutions, in
order to control government actions (Sirach, 2009, p.32).
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Therefore, in order to find out if the transparency is being effectively used by society as an instrument of
social control, it is necessary to answer if the information that was rendered transparent could be converted
into an instrument of action by the citizen or society in general. In pursuit of said answer, one must check,
firstly, if the institutional instruments available under the Law of Access to Information ("LAI") have
rendered the information more transparent to Brazilian citizens and, secondly, if the Fiscal Responsibility
Law ("LRF") granted upon society the necessary tools to convert said information, especially those pertaining
to public management, into oversight actions over the acts of the public administration.

IV.

Social Access to information in the Law of Access to Information (“LAI”)

To ascertain whether any institutional improvements of the social control of the civil service have been
implemented, one can make use of the information disclosed by the Controller General's reports (Relatório
sobre a implementação da Lei n 12.527/2011) between 2012 and 2016 regarding the implementation of the
Law of Access to Information (“LAI”) with the procedures set forth for ensuring the fundamental right of
access to information by the citizens4.
The LAI regulates the CFRB 5, making it an enforceable right, that is, establishing general guidelines regarding
the procedures that must be followed by the public authorities so as to guarantee to the citizens the full
exercise of their right. It remains to be seen whether if, starting from these favorable institutional conditions,
citizens have been effectively demanding information from government bodies and how this has been
happening.
Since the LAI was promulgated until the balance of its first year of effect 6, it can be observed that there has
been a series of measures aimed at the implementation of its legal devices by the federal executive authorities,
such as the Single Action Plan, the development of e-SIC, the training of civil servants and the creation of
the Network for the Access to Information. In an overview of the implementation of the LAI, from May
2012 to December of 2016, it was observed that almost all of the received requests were answered. Out of
the answered requests, the vast majority of them was wholly or partially granted, a small portion was denied
and only in rare cases no answer was given to the requests. The monthly average of requests for access to
information has experienced a steady growth over the years 7. In this period, e-SIC recorded requests from
approximately 89% of the country's municipalities. The data suggests that the administrative measures taken
to facilitate the implementation of the LAI rendered positive effects in ensuring high levels of response to
requesters from all over the national territory and in encouraging requesters to use the institutional channel
The Law of Access to Information is comprised of general rules that are immediately applicable to all bodies and entities
that are subject to said law and a part that is applicable only to the Executive Branch of the Federal Government. Each
one of the Branches and federative entities, in accordance with its constitutional autonomy, must then take measures to
issue their own specific regulations, observing the general guidelines of the Law. Decree no. 7,724, from May 16, 2012,
regulated the LAI in the context of the Federal Executive Branch, defining the procedures that must be adopted by state
bodies and entities to ensure society's effective access to public information. The source of data for these Reports has
as its advantages its public and official character, and, furthermore, allows for the comparison and analysis of the same
data over a time span of at least five years, given that this law was only promulgated in 2011 and that the reports cover
the period from 2012 to 2016. No comparisons with previous periods shall be made. The intention here is to examine
the impact of a new institutional tool of social control.
5 More specifically, the LAI regulates what is set forth in item XXXIII of art. 5, in item II of paragraph 3 of article 37 and
in paragraph 2 of art. 216 of the Constitution of the Federative Republic of Brazil.
6 Relatório sobre a implementação da Lei nº 12.527/2011. Controladoria Geral da União – CGU. Brasília, maio de 2013
(2011-2012).
7 Table of the monthly average of requests of access to information. Ministry of Transparency and Office of the Federal
Government Controller General. Relatório sobre a implementação da Lei nº 12.527/2011: Lei de Acesso à Informação.
Poder Executivo Federal 2016.
4

4

of the LAI. In this sense, it is possible to affirm that the impacts of the LAI were positive for the expansion
of the access to information regarding federal government bodies. Thus, not only the institutional conditions
are present, but also the material and organizational conditions for the implementation of the social control
of public information.
Beyond this broader overview, the data contained in the Reports also allows for a more detailed look into
the profile of the requesters; the geographical regions from which most requests came; the government
bodies with the most requests; the justifications provided when denying requests; and the motivations that
led requesters to file appeals. A more detailed analysis of said data can strengthen or refute the more general
overview of the positive impacts of the LAI.
By analyzing the reports it is possible to verify that the profile of the requesters is made up of people with
higher education; that the geographical regions with the most requesters are the southeast, center-west and
south, in that order; that the public bodies with more requests were ministries, government corporations,
regulating bodies and government-owned companies; denials or refusals to provide the requested
information represented a small minority of total requests; appeals presented by requesters because of partial
or total refusal of their requests represent a small minority over the analyzed period.
In light of all that, a more detailed analysis of the data contained in the Reports confirms the assessment of
the broader data and reveals that the creation of unified procedures for the request of information has had a
positive impact on the exercise of social control of public affairs, which has been supported, throughout the
years, by the adoption of administrative and organizational measures geared to the implementation of its legal
rule by the Federal Executive Branch. All evidence suggests that a confluence of a virtuous combination of
institutional factors and administrative effort took place. This confluence enabled Brazilian citizens to
demand, effectively, information from various segments of the federal government, by creating the
conditions for the existence of high rates of response to the demands for information and keeping it in high
levels over the years.
However, this positive impact, translated into the high number of answers provided, does not allow one to
verify, quality-wise, if the requests answered contained explanations about the actions or omissions of the
federal government in the execution of its public policies. Hence, a possible improvement of governmental
transparency, by means of the LAI, could be the development of quality indexes regarding the information
provided, so as to generate a richer set of data for the oversight of the public administration. And, on the
citizen's side, another positive impact is how the social control of the civil service complements the external
oversight performed by the oversight bodies when the requests made by the general populace demand
explanations from the segments of the federal administration about the planning of actions and the decisionmaking processes.

V.

Society's use of information in the Fiscal Responsibility Law (“LRF”)

Over the past 30 years, substantial reforms in the area of public finance were carried out in Brazil. The
institutional and legal framework of public finances in the 80s had little transparency to it and it made
oversight difficult by both Congress and society (Tavares, 2005, p.80). In this context, the Citizen's
Constitution established the need for legislation regarding public finance, which was achieved, in no small
measure, with the promulgation of the LRF.
The LRF created instruments for the transparency of fiscal management, embodied in the periodic disclosure
of reports, in holding regular public hearings, submitting the accounts of the heads of the branches,
encouraging popular participation and strengthening social control. In several of its rules, this Law determines
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that all information is to be disclosed in electronic means, expanding citizens’ potential access to it via the
internet. In the public transparency logic established in the LRF, popular participation is encouraged with
the holding of public hearings, during the preparation of budgetary plans and the budget guidelines law and
of budgets themselves. Following this logic, the Transparency Portal was created in order to disclose detailed
data and information about the budgetary and financial of the Federal Government and allow the citizens to
monitor the Federal Government's implementation of programs and actions. And, going beyond these
improvements, standards and clear criteria geared to the bookkeeping and consolidation of accounts were
also defined and the presentation of accounting statements and reports was standardized, which contributes
to the comparison of information provided by the various segments of the public administration.
In the wake of the first years of the implementation of the LRF, more specifically during its first five years,
preliminary and direct studies have already revealed some of its effects, from a standpoint of the use of
budgetary and fiscal information by the society (Culau and Fortis, 2006, p.12-14). According to these studies,
even with the creation of the LRF, the transparency of fiscal, budgetary and financial information of the
public administration have proved to be insufficient in what pertains to bringing the citizen closer to the
administration, in bringing society closer to the State. As main causes for this, the authors point out
specifically the low level of education of the Brazilian population and a difficulty to understand the technical
language. These causes then hindered the understanding of how the Brazilian budgetary structure functions,
which is already quite complex, and that, even with the LRF, was still restricted to a circle of specialists. In
addition to these causes, they emphasize that the precariousness of the administrative and institutional
structure of Brazilian cities also negatively affect the transparency and society's control of public resources.
It is worth noting that the LRF itself provides ways to encourage the State to come closer to society and to
allow that the information of the public affairs is turned into actions of social control, such as: technical
assistance to cities rendered by the federal government for the modernization of the administrative apparatus
and to contribute to the production and disclosure of knowledge; the creation of a fiscal management council,
comprised of representatives from all branches and spheres of government, the Public Prosecutor's Office
and technical entities that represent the society. These legal incentives endeavor to seek appropriate solutions
to address the issue of language and access to complex information reports and statements.
It is not possible to evaluate what was the effectiveness of the social control by looking at the activities of
the Council of Fiscal Management (CGF), given that even after 18 years from the promulgation of the LFR,
the CGF is yet to be constituted, therefore having no regulations 8. The proposals currently discussed for the
regulation of the CGF involve changes in its competences. Among the proposals are included the
harmonization of technical interpretations on the application of standards geared to the fiscal management
responsibility; the issuance of general rules for the consolidation of public accounts, seeking to converge with
the international standards; the standardization of the account rendering and fiscal reports and statements
required by the LRF; the adoption of simpler norms and standards for cities with fewer than 50 thousand
inhabitants. In this regard, it has been verified that the social control of public finance management, despite
the institutional improvements obtained with the LRF, did not progress as much as it could have, and even
in the regulatory proposals, it seems to focus the weight representation in internal and external control bodies
of the executive branch.
The regulation template for the Council of Fiscal Management (CGF), a body set forth by the LRF, is still under
discussion in the National Congress. A proposal for amending the LRF8 is currently in discussion. The aim is to alter the
CGF's competences and fixes its composition in 12 members, with voting rights, presided by the Minister of Finance,
and it favors a composition of technical members, with personnel from the executive branch and from the bodies or
internal and external control. PLP 210/15. Rapporteur Pauderney Avelino.
8
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The challenge of facilitating the exercise of social control requires measures that would enable the active
participation of the citizen in the control of the public management and, in this sense, perhaps regulating the
CGF could be further advanced if it included in its proposals the encouragement of drafting Integrated
Reports 9 capable of translating to a non-specialized public the goals and results of the governments’ financial
management and the stimulation of a policy for the creation of state and municipal fiscal councils, with
greater social participation and with the training of its citizens, in the form of councils directed to the Social
Services area 10.

VI.

Transparency and External Oversitght of Public Administration

Examining the constitutional design of the TCU reveals that the constituents of 1988 gave TCU a prominent
role as the external oversight body of government acts and the use of public resources. Said Court is an
autonomous institution, financially and administratively independent, not integrating the hierarchical
structure of any of the branches of power, and it effectively exercises oversight in all levels and bodies of the
State, with competences stemming directly from the Constitution 11.
In the constitutional logic, TCU's role is that of accounting, financial, budgetary, operational and asset
oversight of the units of the Federal Government's Powers and all other governmental entities at the federal
level. In a clear sign of the comprehensiveness of its competences, any natural person or legal entity who
uses, garners, stores, manages or handles money, assets and monies that are public is subject to rendering its
accounts for the examination of the oversight bodies. In this point, it is worth pointing out that, in their
reports on government accounts, the TCU has rejected on two occasions the accounts of federal
governments, in 1937, in the Vargas' administration, and in 2014, in Dilma's administration, this last one
already in the period of democracy and in the effect of the Constitution of 1988 (Relatório de Atividades do
TCU - 3º Trimestre 2015, p.5), which contributed to the impeachment of President Dilma, as a result of
shortcomings in the implementation of the budgets of the Federal Government and operations carried out
with federal public resources, according to the judgment of the National Congress.
The federal legislation has been confirming and reinforcing the constitutional logic, providing to the TCU
the necessary institutional instruments to carry out a comprehensive external oversight of public accounts,
as laid down in Complementary Law no. 63 (1990) and Federal Law no. 8,443/92. Corroborating a trend of
concentrating and expanding the external oversight of the public actions and policies, other powers have
been bestowed upon the TCU by means of specific laws, such as the Law of Tenders and Contracts (Law
no. 8,666/93), the Fiscal Responsibility Law (Complementary Law no. 101/2000), the Law that regulates the
sharing of resources of the Cide - Contribution of Intervention in the Economic Domain (Law no.
10,866/2004), the annual issues of the Law of Budgetary Guidelines and of the Annual Budget Law and,
An integrated report is a concise document about how strategy, governance, performance and perspectives of an
organization (public or private), in the context of its external environment, lead to the generation of value in the short,
medium and long term. This new approach to the rendering of information to the public is based on the philosophy and
guidelines developed by the International Integrated Reporting Council (IIRC), a global coalition of regulators, investors,
companies, standard makers, professionals in accounting secot and NGOS. www.theiirc.org.
10 Such as the Municipal Councils of Social Services, responsible for guiding and overseeing the funds for Funds for
Social Services and supervise the entities and organizations of social services; the Municipal Councils of the Elderly,
competent to supervise, monitor, oversee and evaluate national policies on the elderly; and the Social Control Instances
of the Bolsa Família Program, responsible for following up, evaluating and subsidizing oversight and monitoring, in the
municipalities, the process regarding the enrollment of families, selection of beneficiaries, granting and maintenance of
the benefits, control of the fulfillment of its grantig conditions.
9

The main section of art. 71 of the Constitution of 1988, establishes: Art. 71. The external control, a responsibility of
the National Congress, shall be exercised with the aid of the Federal Public Finance Court, whose competences are: [...]
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more recently, the Laws of Public-Private Partnership (Law no. 11,079/2004) and the Law for the Hiring of
Public Consortia (Law no. 11,107/2005).
But, apart from its many institutional oversight tools, TCU must also render accounts of their actions and
oversight to the society. In the Brazilian constitutional model of a democratic state of law, the public agents
- those who were voted into office or not - are obligated to account for their actions to society
(accountability). In this model, the control mechanisms are situated in two spheres: the mechanisms of
vertical controls: from the society in relation to the State - such as, for example, voting in elections, which
means rewarding or punishing a ruler; social claims made using the freedom of opinion, freedom of
association and freedom of access to information; and the mechanisms of horizontal controls: agencies and
state institutions whose competence is to monitor and punish unlawful acts and/or omissions committed by
their counterparts in the State, such as the TCU itself.
The answer that is then needed is if the institutional instruments made available to the TCU (a body that
must operate as a mechanism of horizontal control of public accounts) were effectively used for the public
transparency and lived up to the expectations that they would improve the fundamental rights of Brazilians
in having access to information about public affairs. In other words, it is necessary to investigate if, from the
perspective of the citizen in relation to the body for external oversight, there has been an improvement on
accountability, in particular in the dimension of the democratic control, based on the responsiveness and
transparency of the public agent (Denhardt e Denhardt, 2003. p. 131-137).
In a democracy, pursuant to what the TCU itself has asserted, the legitimacy and the perception of the
relevance of a public institution depend both on the results achieved and on the disclosure and use of such
results by the citizen. In this sense, expanding the disclosure of information about public management, and
the results and benefits of the external control to the society, to the press, public bodies and councils legally
responsible for the social control strengthens the exercise of one's civic duty and the system of external
oversight itself (Relatório de Atividades do TCU, 2006. p, 50) and represents an improvement of the
accountability in its democratic dimension (Diamond, 1999, p.30,34). Therefore, in order to evaluate the
implementation of the constitutional project of public transparency over the last 30 years, one must verify
whether the institutional improvements in the external oversight bodies meant progress in the disclosure of
information about the allocation of public resources and about the results of government policies, in the
specific eyes of the citizen.

VII. Access to information about the allocation of public resources
Thanks to the architecture of the CRFB and the institutional improvement of the LAI, in the 2000s a
transparency webpage was developed in the TCU's Internet Portal, with miscellaneous information regarding
governance and management, as well as a system to request access to information. As a complement, the
Court also submits to its TCU Portal Annual and Quarterly Activity Reports and Management Reports, in
which the TCU's annual accounts are rendered with a summary of the results of all actions undertaken, as
well as a demonstration of the use of the budgetary and financial resources made available to it. Here, one
can perceive the existence of an institutional channel stemming from the TCU and directed to the society,
with the potential to strengthen the exercise of one's civic duties and the external control system itself and,
in this sense, it can be grasped as an improvement on the accountability of the Court, in its democratic
dimension.
From the perspective of the citizen in relation to the TCU, the TCU's Ombusdman channel stand out. This
Ombudsman has the responsibility to receive suggestions for improvement, criticisms, complaint or
information regarding a service rendered by the Court or receive any news of irregularity in an administrative
act practiced by a public servant dedicated to the TCU. In a comparative study between the years of 2005
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and 2016, it is possible to say that there were growing interest and participation of citizens in matters related
to the implementation and use of public resources, which also suggests an improvement on the accountability
of the Court, in its democratic dimension, by bringing the social control closer to the external control
(Relatório de Atividades do TCU, 2006, p.50 and Relatório Anual de Atividades do TCU, 2017, p.9,72-75).
Still, in the realm of democratic accountability in the 2010s, other institutional actions by the TCU focused
on public transparency and in providing information directly to the society stand out, such as the creation of
the blog #EuFiscalizo aimed at the citizen, with the objective to instigate and disclose actions of social control
and civic duty; the disclosure of institutional videos of their audits, events and special hearings, and the
thematic campaigns, using social networks; the provision of services to citizens, such as the possibility of
issuing a certificate stating that one's name is not registered in the Inactive And Untrustworthy system
(Relatório Anual de Atividades do TCU, 2017, p.72-73); and the incentive to strengthen social control, from
sharing information and documents to the exchange of experiences and personnel training, based on an
oversight network, all accessible on the TCU Portal. These actions reveal an institutional concern of the
federal body for external control in the realm democratic accountability. But it should also be noted that
these actions, intensified in the second half of the 2010s, are the broad contemporary popular movement
known as "the June days" of 2013, which questioned the quality of public services, provided under the
concession scheme or not, throughout the country. It seems that, in the eyes of the citizen, there were
grounds for a great dissatisfaction with the state's governance and management ability. Within this
perspective, the Brazilian society sought to exert a social control over the constituted authorities, also seeking
to further improve the accountability of its representatives.
On its turn, Public Dialogue, a project developed by the TCU also in the 2000s, consisted of a set of
systematic actions fostering the relationship, disclosure and exchange of information among the TCU, the
society, the National Congress and the public managers, in the different spheres of government, aiming to
stimulate the social control, performed by the citizens directly or by way of the oversight bodies, and guidance
offered to public managers and members of community councils (Relatório de Atividades do TCU, 2006,
p.52-53). This project, along with other incentives for the strengthening of social control, suggests the
creation of a more coordinated and interactive environment of social and external control, in addition to
enabling the development of a more organic network for the exchange of information. But it also raises a
scenario of asymmetry of knowledge and information among the citizens who exert social control and the
bureaucracy of the TCU, which concentrates, in addition to the institutional tools, a large capacity for
production, per se, of data and information. Hence, the citizen seems to be more of a requester of
information than a producer of new information, with the ability to criticize or dispute the TCU's reports
and analysis.

VIII. Access to information about the results of public policies
In the same pace that the audit courts assimilate the need to consider the question of the evaluation of public
policies of the government actions they oversee, they also need to consider the issue regarding the
operationalization of said oversight. The role of external oversight bodies, such as the TCU, is not restricted
to the approval or rejection of accounts and enforcement of penalties, but it also aims to adjust or correct
the course taken so that goals can be achieved and programs approved and can subsidize new plans for public
policies. In this sense, a lot of criticism has been flung at the lack of oversight by the TCU regarding the
course of public policies, which would have even facilitated corruption and misappropriation of funds,
forcing the society, responsible for bankrolling the State, to bear higher costs. That criticism may have
stimulated the TCU's greater protagonism in this regard, leading to a more specific evaluation of government
programs.
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Therefore, the objective of the program evaluation is to examine the effectiveness of governmental programs
and projects. This audit method seeks to verify to what the actions implemented succeeded in producing the
effects desired by the administration. In this direction, the TCU conducts audits of an operational nature.
From 2013, the TCU began to produce systemic oversight reports (Fisc) and consolidated the disclosure of
said reports from 2015 on, with the explicit goal of evaluating public policies. This initiative points to a
reclassification of external control by enabling a continuous discussion of the results of public policies. In
this sense, the TCU conducts audits of an operational nature, which allow, in principle, an analysis about the
main trends of improvement, stagnation or retrogression of these policies. If this initiative is confirmed as a
repeated practice of qualitative analysis of public policies, and proposals for correcting them in the course of
their implementation, we shall then be closer to the new concept of governance which seeks to integrate
politics and administration, management and public policies, within a vision of government as a
comprehensive, plural and complex process of society (Martins e Marini, 2014, p. 43).
Perhaps inspired by this new concept, the Report of Government Policies and Programs of 2017 (RePP,
2017, p.1-4) showed the existence of deficits in institutional governance and in the management of the federal
public administration, which produce generalized inefficiencies in the federal public spending. By doing so,
this report offers, albeit indirectly, an analysis on the quality of our democracy itself and on the results
achieved by the constitutional project of 1988. The inefficiencies identified in this report implicate
considerable waste and systemic deviations in the application of federal public resources. Based on the
analysis of these consolidated findings, one concludes that these institutional deficits, if left uncorrected, are
capable of maintaining the low efficiency of the public services and assets offered by the State, which have
been perceived by society as inadequate and insufficient. Within this context, external oversight bodies should
pursue strategies and encourage decision-making processes that promote the elimination or reduction of
these deficits, with proposals that seek to involve the Brazilian society and mobilize it, since these institutional
deficits can easily become democratic deficits, causing distrust from the society regarding the legitimacy of
the democratic regime itself and its accountability and ability to produce adequate and sufficient public
services, compromising the achievements that have been reached up to this point.
However, today the democratic accountability standart is far from our accountability reality if we consider
the reality of all other audit courts in Brazil. In the period of the New Republic, with the exception of the
TCU itself, in the great majority of the Cities and States Audit Courts there is not a major concern in what
pertains to the concept of accountability, even in relation to its bureaucratic dimension. These bodies remain
limited to traditional standards of oversight, restricted to verifying whether public agents have acted
accordingly (Barros, 2000, p.167,213). In this sense, some researchers argue that Brazilian public finance
courts seem to be ineffective in promoting this concept (Rocha, 2009, p.13), and correlate the cause of this
low effectiveness with the fact that their reports and opinions do not reflect all the dimensions of the concept
(Denhardt and Denhardt, 2003, p.131-137), grouped in three planes: the bureaucratic control of compliance
with the laws and regulations; the control of performance, represented by obtaining a maximum productivity
of public resources by means of controlling the results of the action; and the democratic control, based on
the responsiveness and transparency of the public servant.
Thusly, the dimension of the democratic oversight, seared in the Citizen's Constitution, has not been reflected
in the structures of the Audit Courts of the Brazilian States and it amasses, in addition to the demands for
bureaucratic oversight and performance, a new requirement, embodied in the double requirement, at one
time, of reports and opinions that are at the same time instruments of analysis and evaluation of the actions
of public entities and agents, as well as instruments of disclosure of the work of these entities and agents for
those social actors who are interested. In this sense, in order to follow the constitutional logic of external
oversight, it is necessary that all the reports and opinions incorporate a fundamental component to the
democratic dimension of accountability: communicability, i.e., the defined standards of analysis and
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systematization of information, an appropriate periodicity, wide disclosure, guaranteed availability and access
and, mainly, intelligibility (Rocha, 2009, p.11).
To ensure that Brazilian public finance courts behave effectively and contribute to the improvement of public
administration and for the improvement of the social control, their reports, analysis and opinions must be
made known and intelligible to the society and to the citizen. On its turn, it is also necessary that the social
actors explore the existing possibilities of implementation of accountability from the information produced
by these oversight bodies and demand improvements so as to make the social control a better tool.

IX.

Conclusion

Several segments of the direct and indirect federal public administration showed improvements in the
transparency indicators of the LAI and the disclosure of audits and TCU's reports on the results of public
policies was made more robust. It was possible to verify that these improvements were sustained by the
institutional evolution generated by the federal legislation, in respect to the fundamental rights expressed in
the 1988's CFRB, which was promulgated by the Congress over the last thirty years, but emphasized in the
last decade and, more specifically, in the last five years, in a gradual and complementary fashion.
In the realm of social control of public affairs, more specifically in the case of the LAI, there was a confluence
of a virtuous combination of institutional factors and administrative efforts. This combination enabled
Brazilian citizens to demand, in an effective manner, information from the various segments of the federal
government by creating the conditions for high rates of responsiveness to the requests for information and
maintaining it in a high level over time. However, this positive impact, translated into the high number of
answers provided, does not allow one to investigate, in what pertains to quality, if the answered requests
contained explanations about the actions or omissions of the federal government in the execution of its
public policies. Hence, a possible improvement of governmental transparency, via LAI, could take place with
the development of quality indexes regarding the information provided, in order to reveal a richer set of data
for the oversight of the public actions and policies. And, on the citizen's side, a growing interest in public
affairs and in information about the public administration was verified, with the effective use of the
institutional means available.
In the field of external control, there was a movement towards improving the legal mechanisms of
governance, the monitoring of the public expenditures, which was also stimulated by the TCU's actions,
which intensified and deepened its audits and demands to the various segments of the federal government.
This combination of new legal landmarks over the years and of the federal oversight body committed to
enforce said legal landmarks, favored the implementation of new transparency practices and the development
of the necessary means for it, and stimulated a more favorable scenario for citizens to be brought closer to
the public arena. Still the citizen acts more as a requester than a producer of new information, albeit capable
of criticizing or disputing the reports and analyses of the TCU. Even so, in a general way, today the concept
of democratic accountability is far from the reality of the rest of the Brazilian public finance courts. In the
period of the New Republic (1988-2018), with the exception of the TCU itself, in the great majority of the
external oversight bodies of the federative entities, there is not a major concern in what pertains to this
concept.
In summary, if on the one hand there was improvement in the monitoring of the federal government
activities, with a more institutionalized, more direct access and with greater access of Brazilian citizens to the
information of the public entities who produce public assets and render public services, on the other hand
in the reports analyzed one cannot find any consolidated or conclusive information about the quality of the
information received by the Brazilians citizens. Thus, it is necessary to advance further in the investigations
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regarding measurements, quantity and quality-wise, of the responses provided by the various segments of the
Brazilian federal government.
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